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Questioning Quintiles: Implications of Choices of Measures for Income
Inequality and Social Mobility
Abstract
Movement across quintiles of household income has become a standard measure of social mobility. This
choice of what to count (households rather than people) is consequential. Earlier, absolute measures of social
mobility (such as the percentage of sons of blue-collar fathers gaining white-collar positions). However,
measuring movement across quintiles conceptualizes social mobility as relative, as a zero-sum game (in that it
seems obvious that for each person who moves to a higher quintile, another must fall). However, there are
problems with using quintiles. First, each quintile contains a fifth of all households, rather than a fifth of all
people. There are far more people in the top quintile than in the bottom. Second, while income inequality is
increasing, the increase is not because the proportion of the population that is low-income is increasing, but
because the upper-middle class is expanding (and now includes more than a fifth of all households). While
choosing to measure mobility in terms of quintiles is not mathematically wrong, it shapes the way the data can
be read. Understanding the consequences of such choices is relevant to understanding the numeracy of the
measure.
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Introduction 
Quintiles of household income have become a standard measure used in public 
debates about contemporary economic inequality and social mobility (e.g., recent 
reports on social mobility: the Pew Charitable Trusts Economic Mobility Project 
2012; the Brookings Institution 2014a1).  The goal of this paper is to examine how 
using quintiles of household income to measure inequality and mobility is 
consequential; specifically, it draws our attention to particular features of these 
topics while ignoring others. 
It is important to appreciate that earlier generations of social scientists (e.g., 
Lipset and Bendix 1959; Thernstrom 1964) adopted different measures of mobility, 
often the rate of moving from blue- to white-collar occupations.  This measure 
could be used to track both individual mobility (e.g., the percentage of individuals 
who started out in blue-collar jobs but wound up in white-collar occupations) and 
intergenerational mobility (e.g., the percentage of sons of blue-collar fathers who 
went into white-collar work).  Measuring mobility was understood to be an 
important topic because many Americans assumed that the United States was a 
uniquely open society that offered many more opportunities for upward mobility 
than other countries, as reflected in celebrations of the American Dream and 
Horatio Alger’s stories.  In fact, the researchers’ results tended to dampen this 
enthusiasm: they showed that only a minority of blue-collar Americans were 
upwardly mobile, and that mobility rates in the United States weren’t that different 
from those in other countries. 
Still, measuring mobility from blue- to white-collar seemed to make sense.  It 
had a sort of face validity; blue- and white-collar work seemed like proxies for the 
working and middle classes.  It was relatively easy to find data on occupations, 
which are included in nineteenth-century manuscript census schedules, as well as 
in most contemporary datasets; this availability made it possible to compare 
mobility patterns across time and space.  And it could be used to produce a single 
number (e.g., X% of sons of blue-collar fathers entered white-collar occupations); 
at least in theory, the mobility rate could range from 0 to 100 percent. 
However, it is also easy to see why contemporary social scientists favor 
measuring mobility across quintiles of household income.  Income is measured in 
dollars, which puts an end to anomalies, such those blue-collar workers who earn 
more than many in white-collar jobs.  Studying data about households could also 
circumvent some outmoded assumptions about families and gender: households 
could be headed by females, built around same-sex couples, and so on.  Quintile 
                                                          
1 Richard Reeves (2014b) of the Brookings Institution also produced an appealing YouTube 
video, “Is America Dreaming: Understanding Social Mobility” that illustrates their findings in an 
especially accessible manner. 
1
Best: Questioning Quintiles
Published by Scholar Commons, 2018
  
data can also be compared to other countries, so long as their governments package 
income data in quintiles, and they can be used to measure inequality, as well as 
mobility.  But, perhaps most importantly, quintile data are accessible.  The 
Census Bureau conducts an annual Current Population Survey and publishes data 
on household income (particularly Table HINC-05: “Percent Distribution of 
Households, by Selected Characteristics within Income Quintile and Top 5 
Percent”) (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). 
What the Data on Household Income Quintiles 
Show 
During the roughly thirty years since World War II, the United States experienced 
relatively equal percentage increases in income across all five income quintiles.  In 
each quintile; income (in constant dollars) roughly doubled: by some measures, the 
bottom quintile actually increased the most (116%), while the top quintile increased 
the least (99%) (Frank 2007).  However, recent decades have seen a very different 
pattern; household income has barely increased in the bottom quintile, while it has 
risen substantially in the top quintile.  These increases have been most dramatic at 
the very top—those in the so-called “One Percent” have seen their incomes rise far 
more than other groups within society.  By all accounts, this has been a period of 
rising inequality in the United States. 
Studies of intergenerational mobility across quintiles of household income also 
reveal a disturbing pattern, what the Pew Charitable Trusts Economic Mobility 
Project (2012) calls “stickiness.”  That is, adults tend to wind up near the quintile 
that their parents occupied.  The largest proportion of children raised in the bottom 
quintile tend to remain “stuck” in that quintile, the next largest share move only to 
the quintile above the bottom, and so on; only a small percentage manage to move 
all the way to the top quintile.  Similarly, children raised in the top quintile are 
most likely to remain there, with relatively few falling all the way to the bottom 
quintile.  Although Reeves (2014b) declares: “[In] a perfectly mobile society–an 
opportunity utopia—being born . . . in the bottom quintile would have no effect on 
where you ended up: you’d be equally likely to make it to the top as to stay at the 
bottom,” the data reveal a pattern very different from that utopian vision. 
Concerns about Quintiles 
Measuring social mobility as movement across quintiles has consequences.  
Crossing the blue-collar/white collar line was not a zero-sum game; it was possible 
for more people to rise than to fall (and, in practice this is what happened as 
industrialization reshaped the workforce by creating many millions of white-collar 
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jobs).  But measuring mobility in terms of shifting quintiles involves very different 
assumptions, as Reeves (2017: 10) acknowledges: “It is a stubborn mathematical 
fact that, at any given time, the top fifth of the income distribution can 
accommodate only 20 percent of the population.  Relative intergenerational 
mobility is necessarily a zero-sum game.  For one person to move up the ladder, 
somebody else must move down.” 
 While it seems commonsensical that “the top fifth of the income 
distribution” contains “20 percent of the population“, this is wrong.  Remember 
that the Census Bureau presents data for quintiles of household income.  That is, 
each quintile contains the same number of households, not equal numbers of 
people.  While we might tend to equate a household with a nuclear family (i.e., a 
father, mother, and their kids), households can take lots of forms.  There are one-
person households, each composed of an individual living alone who is single, 
divorced, widowed, etc.  There are children living in households with only one 
parent, or with one of more grandparents, and so on.  
This diversity in household types is not trivial because it affects income.  
Table 1 compares the composition of the top and bottom quintiles from the 2016 
Current Population Survey.  The differences are stark.  Only 17 percent of 
bottom-quintile households contain married couples, compared to 77 percent in the 
top quintile.  More than half (57%) of the bottom-quintile households consist  
Table 1 
Characteristics of Bottom- and Top-Quintile Households, 2016 
(thousands of households) 
Characteristic 
Bottom Quintile 
<$24,002 
Top Quintile 
>$121,018 
Households 25,245 25,245 
Married couple families  4,388 19,314 
Males living alone  5,583  1,158 
Females living alone  8,817    678 
Head >65  9,527  3,886 
No earners 15,794    970 
Two or more earners  1,090 18,773 
Head employed full-time  4,533 19,619 
of individuals living alone, compared to only 7 percent of the top-quintile 
households.  More than twice as many households in the bottom quintile are 
headed by someone over age 65 (38% vs. 15%).  Vastly more top-quintile 
households have two earners (74% vs. 4%) and are headed by someone who is 
employed full-time (78% vs. 35%).  Of course, if we pause to think about it, it is 
not particularly surprising to discover that the bottom quintile has more single-
person households, more households headed by someone over 65, and fewer 
households where the head is employed full-time.  But this pattern means that the 
bottom and top quintiles differ in their compositions, as well as just their incomes. 
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What is perhaps more surprising is the discovery that all those single-person 
households dramatically affect the bottom quintile’s population.  In 2016, the 
population of the top quintile (78.3 million) was about 76 percent larger than that 
of the bottom quintile (44.5 million).2  Quintiles of households are not quintiles of 
people.  That “stubborn mathematical fact that . . .  the top fifth of the income 
distribution can accommodate only 20 percent of the population” proves to be an 
illusion.  The highest-earning fifth of all households contains about 24 percent of 
the population (estimated to have been 323.1 million in 2016), while the lowest 
quintile contains only about 14 percent of the people. 
The Rise of the Upper-Middle Class 
We regularly hear claims that the middle class is shrinking.  When we hear this, it 
is easy to assume that this must mean that more people are falling behind, that the 
proportion of the population that is poor is growing.  This is wrong.  The sector 
of the population that is growing is the upper-middle class. 
There is no single authoritative definition of what it means to be upper-middle 
class.  Most analysts use an income range to identify those in the upper middle, 
e.g. Rose (2016, 4) sets “the bottom threshold for the upper middle class at five 
times the poverty level, or $100,000 for a family of three.”  Liberal and 
conservative observers agree on several patterns that distinguish this income 
grouping (Brooks 2000; Murray 2012; Putnam 2015).  Increasingly, the upper 
middle class consists of highly-educated individuals, who tend to marry highly-
educated partners.  They are more likely to stay married, and to have two incomes.  
They have longer lifespans, but have fewer unintended pregnancies, fewer 
unplanned births, and fewer children.  Moreover, they tend to live among others 
who share these characteristics.   
Importantly, the upper-middle class is growing.  According to Rose’s (2016) 
classification, between 1979 and 2014, the proportion of the population that is 
upper-middle class more than doubled, from 12.9 percent of the population to 29.4 
percent, while the middle class, lower-middle class, and poor or near-poor 
                                                          
2These totals are approximate.  Table HINC-01 (“Selected Characteristics of Households by Total 
Money Income”) gives the number of people in households, from one to seven or more for 
different income categories (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).  Since the top income in the bottom 
quintile was $24,002 (see Table 1), I multiplied the number of households in a given cell by the 
population of that household (assuming that there were only seven people in the households with 
at least seven members, and multiplying the figure in the $20,000-$24,999 category by 0.8), then 
adding the total to get the number of people in the bottom quintile.  Similarly, since the bottom of 
the top quintile was $121,018, I added 0.8 of the population in the $120,000-124,999 category to 
the figures for all of the higher income categories. 
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categories all shrank (the upper class also grew, from 0.1 percent to 1.8 percent).3  
Remember that this period was when incomes rose more rapidly at the top than the 
bottom; Rose calculates that, had income growth been more even across the social 
structure, the upper-middle class would have grown to an even larger share—35.2 
percent—of the population.  Notice that even under uneven income growth, the 
upper-middle class now accounts for well over a fifth of the population, so that it 
has penetrated the second household-income quintile. 
The expansion of the upper-middle class can be viewed as a continuation of 
the long-term trend in rising living standards.  A century ago, most people’s homes 
lacked running water, electricity, or telephones (Leon 2016).  Today, substantial 
majorities (i.e., 78-99%) of poor households have air conditioning, a microwave, a 
television, and a refrigerator—all basically unavailable 100 years ago (Rector and 
Sheffield 2011). Impossible-to-imagine luxuries have become ubiquitous, even 
among those with the lowest incomes.  In other words, if we measure social 
conditions using absolute standards (such as improvements in life expectancy, 
educational attainment, or standard of living), it is easy to view the glass as half-
full, and to view the expanding upper-middle class as harbingers of society’s 
growing prosperity. 
Still, critics favor using relative standards (such as movement among quintiles) 
that encourage half-empty interpretations.  Richard Reeves (2017) describes the 
upper-middle class as “dream hoarders.”  Because he views mobility as a zero-sum 
game, he argues that creating opportunities for those in lower quintiles to rise 
requires people falling out of the top quintile: “For one person to move up the 
ladder, somebody else must move down.  Sometimes that will have to be one of 
our own children.” (p. 10).  But being a member of the upper-middle class is 
“sticky” because its members are able to give their offspring advantages in the 
competition for social position: upper-middle class parents adopt a set of “concerted 
cultivation” child-rearing practices that give children skills that will prove useful 
when they encounter schools and other institutions run by unfamiliar adults (Lareau 
2011); they can choose to raise their children in areas with better schools; they (and 
their children) receive more guidance on choosing and applying for colleges; they 
have more discretionary income that they can save in tax-sheltered Section 529 
college-savings accounts; and they are better placed to take advantage of legacy 
admission programs and unpaid internships.  Such advantages make it easier for 
children from upper-middle class families to “stick” in the upper-middle class.  If 
we assume that mobility is a zero-sum game, then these advantages serve to 
hoard—to block access to—the American Dream; however, if we view mobility as 
                                                          
3For a parallel analysis using a different data set, see Perry (2016).  These studies define the 
different social classes in terms of income. 
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a non-zero-sum game, in which prosperity in general—and the upper-middle class 
in particular—is expanding, then the language of hoarding seems less applicable. 
Prospects for Upward Social Mobility 
It is possible to exaggerate the rigidity of America’s social structure.  Rank, 
Hirschl, and Foster (2014) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics dataset 
(covering 1968-2009) to track the economic situation of American adults.  They 
found that nearly 90 percent owned their own home at some point during their lives, 
and that “upward and downward income movement is very much part of the 
American economic landscape” (p. 99).  Three-quarters of adults experienced at 
least one year of affluence (defined as an income exceeding $100,000) and nearly 
half experienced at least one year of near poverty (defined as income below 125 
percent of the official poverty line): “In recent years we have heard much talk about 
the 1 percent and the 99 percent of the population.  These percentages are often 
portrayed as static and unchanging.  However, our analysis demonstrates that these 
percentages are by no means static, with many people moving in and out of the 
various top levels of the income distribution” (p. 96). Rather than being stuck in the 
same quintile for their entire lives, individuals often move up and down within the 
larger income structure. 
Census Bureau statistics affirm this pattern.  Periodically the Bureau presents 
results from panel studies that examine whether households shift income quintiles 
over a roughly three-year period.  In the most recent study, about 43 percent of 
households moved—either up or down—into a new income quintile between 2009 
and 2012 (Hisnanick, Giefer, and Williams 2016). In other words, while most 
households remain stuck in the same quintiles across a three-year period, a 
substantial minority switches quintiles (although this study reported less movement 
than there had been in the Bureau’s 1996-1999 analysis, when 48 percent of 
households had moved from one quintile to another [Hisnanick and Walker [2004]). 
But most commentators are less interested in intragrenerational mobility than 
intergenerational mobility, and they tend to focus on studies of mobility across 
income quintiles that measure relative mobility.  Measures of absolute mobility 
offer a somewhat positive picture.  About two-thirds of Americans wind up 
earning higher incomes than their parents, and the percentage of those outearning 
their parents is nearly twice as high for those whose parents were in the bottom 
quintile (82 percent) than those with top-quintile parents (43 percent) (Issacs 2008). 
But critics’ glass-half-empty interpretations tend to emphasize three factors 
that dramatically affect the chances of bottom-quintile children rising to the top 
quintile. The first of these is education: among those raised in the bottom quintile 
who graduate from college, only 10 percent remained stuck in the bottom, while 10 
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percent rose all the way to the top; whereas the comparable figures for those who 
did not receive a college degree were 47 percent staying in the bottom and only 3 
percent rising to the top (Pew Charitable Trusts Economic Mobility Project 2012).  
It turns out that all that advice about the importance of getting an education is well-
founded. 
The second factor, family structure, has similar effects. Among bottom-
quintile children raised by never-married mothers, 50 percent remained stuck, while 
only 5 percent rose to the top quintile; in contrast, among those with continuously-
married mothers, only 17 percent stayed in the bottom quintile, while 19 percent 
reached the top (Reeves 2014a).  Having married parents carries substantial 
advantages. 
The third—and the most troubling—factor is race. In the Brookings study, 51 
percent of blacks remained stuck in the bottom quintile, while only 3 percent made 
it to the top; the comparable figures for whites were only 23 percent remaining in 
the bottom, while 16 percent rose to the top (Reeves 2014a).  These are disturbing 
differences.  Critics may argue that African-Americans, “like all Americans, are in 
a much better position to succeed if they honor certain basic norms: graduate from 
high school; get a full-time job; don’t have a child before age 21 and get married 
before childbearing” (Lowry 2015).  However, Reeves, Rodrigue, and Gold 
(2015) point out that, only considering those who follow this “success sequence”—
who complete high school, find full-time work, and delay childbearing until they 
are married and over 21—whites continue to have an advantage: 73 percent of 
whites and only 59 percent of blacks who followed all three rules attained middle 
class status. 
In sum, there are various ways to approach the study of mobility.  Among 
these, choosing to measure relative mobility across income quintiles highlights 
obstacles to—rather than opportunities for—mobility. 
  
What Is to Be Done? 
 
In his video, Reeves (2014b) states: “[In] a perfectly mobile society—an 
opportunity utopia—being born . . . in the bottom quintile would have no effect on 
where you ended up—you’d be equally likely to make it to the top, as to stay in the 
bottom.”  So, consider a thought experiment: we organize society so that each 
infant at birth is randomly assigned to an income quintile.  Would this indeed be 
an “opportunity utopia”? 
Most Americans probably accept the proposition that people should be 
rewarded for hard work.  This proposition means that parents who invest time in 
raising their children by feeding them nutritious diets, reading to them, and 
encouraging them to do their best, and students who take their studies seriously, as 
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well as employees who work hard at their jobs, are seen as meritorious.  Our 
thought experiment’s assignment of income by lottery would make a mockery of 
these values.  
And, in fact, Reeves concedes as much: “In a society with a largely open, 
competitive labor market, it is not ‘creepy’ to want your children to end up higher 
on the earnings ladder than others.  Not only will this bring them a higher income, 
and all the accompanying choice and security, it is also likely to bring them safer 
and more interesting work” (2017, 99⎼100).  Rather, he defines opportunity 
hoarding as “when valuable, scarce opportunities are allocated in an anti-
competitive manner: that is, influenced by factors unrelated to an individual’s 
performance” (pp. 100-01). 
Rather than focusing on trying to discourage dream hoarding in order to 
maximize movement across income quintiles, it might make more sense to 
appreciate the value of increasing prosperity and the expanding upper-middle class, 
and work toward lifting the absolute—rather than the relative—condition of the 
poorest Americans. 
 
Why Question Quintiles? 
 
Commentators use data on quintiles of household income to criticize rising 
inequality and to argue that American social structure creates obstacles to social 
mobility.  There is nothing particularly innumerate about these arguments; they do 
not involve some sort of error in mathematic reasoning. And yet, I submitted this 
paper to Numeracy. Why? 
Whenever we use numbers to describe the world, we make choices.  
Whenever we do original research, we confront these choices directly: we have to 
choose what to count (and what not to count), how to go about counting, and so on.  
We must define categories, devise methods of measurement, and determine what 
we will sample and how we will go about gathering our data.  Everyone who has 
ever completed a piece of original research realizes that they made such choices, 
and that those choices were consequential, that they shaped the findings.  We deal 
with this reality by making a point of explaining our methods, so that readers can 
assess whether our choices seem reasonable and evaluate whether our findings are 
likely to be sound. 
Perhaps more often, we borrow numbers that others have produced (as when 
commentators use the Current Population Survey’s data on quintiles of household 
income).  In such cases, the numbers we are interpreting have been shaped by the 
choices others made in creating the data.  By most standards, the CPS data are 
pretty good: they are collected by professionals who have put considerable thought 
into what they collect and how they go about it; moreover, their methods are 
8
Numeracy, Vol. 11 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/numeracy/vol11/iss2/art6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1936-4660.11.2.6
  
relatively transparent.  No wonder lots of people use these data with confidence. 
Still, understanding what numbers mean requires not just manipulating them 
according to sound mathematical principles, but also appreciating their limitations. 
Quintiles of household income illustrate this need.  Understanding these data 
requires recognizing that:   
 The category household encompasses a diverse set of social arrangements, so that we need 
to be careful not to assume that a quintile of households is the same as a quintile of people.  
It is easy to spot people casually—and carelessly—equating a quintile of households to a 
fifth of the population. 
 Defining social mobility in terms of moving from one quintile to another posits a zero-sum 
game, whereas other ways of thinking about mobility (e.g., crossing the blue/white collar 
line, or improvements in absolute standards of living) do not make zero-sum assumptions).   
Zero-sum assumptions heighten a sense of conflict and injustice. 
 Many individuals move up and down the income structure even in the short term, so that 
we need to be careful that our assumptions about the rigidity of the social structure do not 
blind us to the changes that actually occur. 
In other words, unless we understand the choices that shaped our data, we risk 
making interpretations that, however mathematically sound they may be, may not 
be warranted. Numeracy involves more than mathematical facility; it requires 
thinking critically about the choices that lie behind the numbers. 
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